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ABNORMAL STRUCTURAL PERFORMANCE DURING LAUNCH PHASE
SUMMARY
Approximately 2 minutes 13 seconds after lift-off of th.e Apollo 6
mission, abrupt changes of strain, vibration, and acceleration measure-
ments were indicated in the S-IVB, instrument unit, adapter, lunar module,
and command and service modules; photographs showed objects coming from
the area of the adapter. The adapter, however, continued to sustain the
required loads with no impairment of the mission.
The investigation was first focused upon the understanding of the
coupled vibration modes and characteristics of the launch vehicle and
spacecraft.' Extensive test programs were conducted. It was eventually
concluded that the adapter failure was not caused by vibration.
Extensive study of the airborne photography and other evidence indi-
cated that a large area of the adapter had lost inner facesheet from the
honeycomb sandwich panels. Loads and stresses resulting from vibration
were determined to be insufficient to initiate such a failure. The inves-
tigation was then directed toward determining the range of pressures that
could have been trapped in the Apollo 6 adapter sandwich panels, and to-
ward determining the tolerance of the panels to withstand pressure with
various degrees of flaws such as adhesive voids and facesheet dents. The
degradation effects of moisture and heat exposure on the adhesive strength
were also studied and tested. These tests and analyses led to the con-
clusion that pressure internal to the sandwich panels could have caused
the failure, if a large flaw existed. The pressure buildup would have
been caused by aerodynamic heating effects on air and moisture trapped
in the panel.
The probable cause of the failure was found in the original ultra-
sonic inspection scan record of the affected adapter panel. In the center
of the region where the adapter failed, horizontally along the station 709
panel splice, the record contained two thick anomalous lines extending
several feet. Without an X-ray record of this region, the significance
of this particular scan record cannot be fully understood. However, since
all other evidence had indicated that the adhesive had to be weakened in
a rather large area to initiate the failure, the investigation was focused
intently upon the station 709 splices of other adapters. Sufficient in-
formation was developed to verify that deficient assembly techniques have
consistently resulted in abnormalities in the structure at this station.
These abnormalities were identified in adapters 12, 13, 1^, 15, and l6.
Before the splice abnormalities were pinpointed, corrective action
was taken to reduce pressure "buildup in the honeycomb panels and to re-
duce heat degrading effects on the adhesive. This was done by drilling
vent holes in the inner facesheet and covering the outer facesheet with
cork. The adapters having identified abnormalities in the station 709
splice are being repaired, and the contractor is investigating ways of
avoiding these -abnormalities in panels yet to be bonded..
INTRODUCTION .
A preliminary review copy of this Anomaly Report was first distrib-
uted in, July.1968 to summarize the analyses performed by a team of NASA
and contractor personnel. Since that time, the flight .data.have been
extensively ..reevaluated and test programs have been conducted. An addi-
tional analytical tool, an ispdensitracer, was used for.quantitative
evaluation of the airborne photography.
, . , . . • ' " DISCUSSION " . ' . . " . . . . .
. . ' ' . , ' " - : FLIGHT CONDITIONS A N D OBSERVATIONS . . . "
• -. Photographs, taken by an. airborne camera .show, .dark areas appearing
on the adapter at about 2:13 and pieces separating shortly thereafter.
The flight, conditions at that time were:
 r
.' Altitude, ft ..".' . '...; . .'. ..... 152 000 . ' . " . '
Mach number 5-^7
• r . . ' ' . ' . - ' . ' • " ' ' . . . . . - • • • • • , )
, Dynamic pressure, psf . . . . 60.23
Angle of .attack, deg . . . . ' . . _ ' 2.0'
Longitudinal loading on the adapter (including that contributed by
bending moments.) at 2:13.27, just.prior to the anomaly, was 727 Ib/in, ' .
at the top, (station "838) and 57.8 .Ib/in. .at. the bottom (station 502) . Of
the top load, 33 percent was., oscillatory at 5 • 5 Hz in a plane H5 degrees
to the pitch plane and through the -Z/+Y panel intersection. Seventeen
percent of the load on the bottom .was oscillatory at 5.5 Hz .'in the pitch
plane. The adapter, structure was qualified by static testing to 1273 lb/
in. at the top 'and 1230 Ib/in. at the bottom under ambient environmental
conditions.
LONGITUDINAL OSCILLATIONS
Because the spacecraft was experiencing an unusually high level of
low frequency (5 -5 Hz) oscillations at the time of the anomaly, numerous
tests and analyses were performed to determine whether these oscillations
caused or contributed to the failure. All evidence from.the investiga-
tions has led to the conclusion that the anomaly -was not caused t>y the
oscillations. ' .
-A modal survey was performed on the' adapter shell structure follow-
ing the Apollo 6 flight", and a total of eleven mo'des of vibration were
identified. Seven were in the U.90 to 7.2U Hz band, and significant
motion of the lunar module was noted. These modes can be characterized
as the lunar module acting as a spring-mass system and the adapter pro-
viding elastic constraint. Four modes where the motions of the shell
were significant were identified in the 17-88 to 27-73 Hz band; these may
be characterized as "classical" shell modes.
A review of the flight accelerometer data indicates only 5-5 Hz re-
sponse just prior to the anomaly, and a maximum deflection of 0.15 inch
at the lunar module attachment was deduced. This deflection is an order
of magnitude less than that required to overstress the shell significantly.
Although no accelerometers were mounted on the adapter panel for the
Apollo 6 flight, excitation of the modes in the 17.88 to 27.73 Hz band
would have been detected by accelerometers on the lunar module/adapter
attachment fitting, since node lines of these modes do not pass through
the attachment points. Response of the higher frequency modes was observed
during the lift-off and maximum dynamic pressure regions, where acoustic
and. aerodynamic buffet, respectively, provide excitation.
In addition to the testing done at MSC, Langley Research Center per-
formed tests-on. a 1/10-scale model of the full stack configuration, where-
in the Apollo 6 static and dynamic loading was simulated. No failure
mechanism applicable to the Apollo 6 anomaly was identified during those
tests, which are reported in Langley Working Paper LWP-689.
On the basis of the ground and flight test data, it is concluded that
the forcing phenomena experienced during flight did not result in suffi-
cient response to precipitate structural failure of the shell.
VISUAL EVIDENCE
Details of the photographs taken by the airborne camera were made
more quantitative by scanning with an isodensitracer, which could dis-
criminate 1*8 incremental changes in density between .black and white.
Figure 1 shows the results from 3 of the .39 frames processed. The anom-
alous area suddenly appeared on the frame taken at 2:13.287, the preced-
ing frames having shown nothing unusual. In subsequent frames, the
density pattern changed from frame to frame and returned to the original
color in some areas; these data have been interpreted as inward deflection
of the surface and subsequent return to the original curvature. It has
been .concluded from the terminator line- of the right side of the adapter
that these deflections were quite large, on the order of 6 to 12 inches.
An undamaged panel (1.7-inch-thick honeycomb sandwich) cannot deflect to
these magnitudes and subsequently return to the original shape. There-
fore, the data have been further interpreted as indication that the de-
flecting-area, is outer facesheet only, possibly with some fragments, of
core attached .but with no inner facesheet.
The isodensitracer was also used to determine orientation and size
of the .fragments seen.in the photographs. Out-of-plane (shutter plane)
orientation .of a particle was determined by the grouping of .the constant-
density contour lines across the face of the particle. Closely spaced
lines on one side and broadly spaced lines opposite indicated the direc-
tion of out-of-plane tilt.; the degree of contour compaction', showed the
amount of tilt. .The frame at 2:13.587 (fig- 2) captured an. in-plane
view of the two large pieces that came from the adapter at 2:13.^ 20.
These pieces total about 35 square feet in area. ... .
. TIMING OF ANOMALY •
The photographic, frame at'-2:13.287 captured the first visual evi-
dence; however, accelerometers and microphones provided evidence that
the. failure was several millisecoijds earlier. Timing of pertinent instru-
mentation changes during the anomaly is shown in figure 3.
. :• The lunar ..module ,+Z-microphone registered sound beginning at 2:13.296
(fig; U) . . This is-consistent with sound having been generated on the
-Z panel-, approximately 16 ..feet away, at about 2:13.281. The command
module pitch and tangential accelerometers tended to confirm this .time,
showing what might be interpreted as the beginning of a change at
2:13.280 (fig..U).
The lunar module -Z microphone and +Y apex radial accelerometer, .
both near the -Z panel, show pronounced changes at 2:13.283 (fig. *0 .
The disturbance saturated the amplifier of the microphone and allowed the
+Y apex fitting to accelerate radially outward at a rate about six times
that experienced one-half cycle earlier. The -Z microphone was about
2 feet from the -Z .panel surface; this location is consistent with sound
originating -at -the /panel .surface at 2:13.282., t
Because the -Z microphone change can "be interpreted relatively well
and because the microphone was close to the anomalous area, the time of
the failure must have been very near 2:13.282.
ADAPTER STRAIN MEASUREMENTS
Ten of the lU adapter strain gages were rendered inoperative by the
anomaly. The four remaining measurements, located at station 775,
6 = 2lh degrees (fig. 5), indicated longitudinal and circumferential
strains for the outer and inner facesheets of the -Y panel. Power for
the gages that failed was received through a wire harness routed up the
inside wall of the -Z panel. The four gages which remained operative
received power through a separate wire harness.
Prior to the anomaly, all the gages were measuring strains similar,
to those experienced on the Apollo h mission. At the time of the anom-
aly, the longitudinal compression stress in the -Y panel increased in
both facesheets; the circumferential stress increased in compression on
the inner facesheet but remained essentially unchanged on the outer face-
sheet (fig. 6). One possible cause is that the -Z panel lost effective-
ness for carrying longitudinal loading and imposed high circumferential
loading upon the upper half of the -Y panel.
The increase in longitudinal stress on the -Y panel can be approxi-
mated by complete removal of the -Z panel (station 838 to station 58^ ),
with a resulting shift of neutral axis toward the +Z side for the remain-
ing structure. However, removal of the panel does not explain the high
increase in circumferential stress on the -Y panel; this shift would have
necessitated a circumferential loading of 525 Ib/in. compression near
station 775. Thus, the nature of damage in the upper half of the -Z panel
may have been such that longitudinal stiffness was drastically reduced
while circumferential rigidity was unaffected, and since the circumferen-
tial loading on the -Y panel increased sharply, the -Z panel must have
been locally deformed. The foregoing suggests that the facesheets on the
upper half of the -Z panel were intact, but the panel may have sustained
longitudinal failure and some deformation along the -Y/-Z edge member.
PRESSURE DROP OF ADAPTER CAVITY
At approximately 2:13, two independent pressure measurements indi-
cated a change of about 0.2 psi in the adapter/instrument unit/S-IVB
stage cavity pressure. The changes were detected by a differential
pressure sensor in the environmental control system of the instrument
unit and by a pressure transducer in the S-IVB forward skirt. Both
measurements were commutated, but the change in pressure occurred in
less than 1 second. The instrument unit sensor measured a drop of 0.1
to 0.15 psi in 0.6 second, and the S-IVB sensor measured a drop of
0.18 psi in 0.8 second.
The hole size necessary to cause the measured pressure changes is
16 to 30 square feet based on instrument unit sensor data or 35 square
feet based on S-IVB sensor data. These computations represent a range
of interpretation of time and pressure changes.
TRAJECTORIES OF FRAGMENTS
The trajectories of the falling pieces were analyzed to determine
whether the pieces were aluminum facesheet, honeycomb core, paint, cork,
or. sandwich panel. Ballistic coefficients developed for each type mate-
rial were based, on a drag coefficient of 0.85. -
. The trajectories of the two largest pieces were determined to require
a reciprocal ballistic coefficient of between 30 and TO. The only mate-
rial, found to fall .within this range was the 0.029-inch outer facesheet,
either alone or with core attached.
TELEMETRY INTERRUPTION
The.two lunar module test article antennas, which were located below
the adapter panels (+Z/+Y quadrant and -Z/-Y quadrant), showed momentary
drops of more than 50 dB from 2:13-3^ to 2:13.360. About 13 milliseconds
later, RF drops of 10 to 15 dB and 8 dB were also noted from certain in-
strument' unit and S-IVB antennas, respectively. The geometry of the •
vehicle position with respect to the ground stations was such that the
line of sight could have been interrupted by falling metallic material.
PITCH TRANSIENT AT SEPARATION
When the command and service module was pyrotechnically separated
from the adapter, acceleration transients were experienced in both the
spacecraft and launch vehicle. The spacecraft was given a maximum pitch-
down rate of 1.6 deg/sec, and the launch vehicle was given a maximum
longitudinal, deceleration of 0.21g. These transients can be explained
by a short-duration forward thrust of the -Z adapter panel.
Each of the adapter panels is normally deployed outward "by two
thrusters aligned axially with the vertical edge members at station 58H.
The panel is hinged at station 58H, and the cross sectional curvature of
the panel provides the required moment arm for torquing the panel out-
ward. The thrusters stroke for 1.5 inches. The combined force of both
thrusters is initially about 9500 pounds, and the force decreases linearly
to zero in the 0.2 second normally required to stroke the 1.5 inches.
To produce the vehicle transients experienced would have required
approximately the total energy of both thrusters; that is, rather than
rotating the -Z panel, the deployment thrusters translated it forward
about 1.5 inches. Also, the panel must have offered little, if any, de-
flection resistance, which would detract from the ability of the thrust-
ers to produce the vehicle transients. The foregoing is consistent with
the strain data in that it indicates that almost all shear rigidity was
lost between the panel and its edge members.
ORBITAL TUMBLING LOADS
Five days after launch, the tumbling S-IVB/adapter was photographed.
The quality of the photographs was insufficient for determination of the
extent of panel damage; however, they did show all panels of the adapter
to be deployed normally. The rotational rate about a lateral axis was
determined to be 90 deg/sec. This rate of rotation indicates that in
preventing the panels from being closed by the centrifugal forces deve-
loped, the outside retention cables were applying substantial loads.
At first, this seemed contradictory to the evidence regarding the strain
gages and the pitch transient; however, analyses showed that only a small
amount of structure between the retention cable attachment to the panel
(fig. 5) and the door is required to restrain the panel from closing. The
failed panel could have resisted collapsing under this restraint by ten-
sion in the outer facesheet, reacted by the hinge.
The assembly tolerances for the retention cable attachment bolts to
the panels permitted an undesirable situation. The bolt was tightened
on two 3-inch-diameter doublers on each side of the honeycomb panel; a
spacer was provided to prevent excessive forces from being applied to the
core (fig. 7)• 'However, drawing tolerances permitted the spacer to be as
much as 0.030 inch undersize; thus, of the 105 in-lb torque normally an-
ticipated with a T/l6-inch-diameter bolt, only 25 percent would have been
sufficient to crush the core. This is not especially serious but is un-
desirable and has been corrected on the drawing.
PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL IK PANELS DURING FLIGHT
The honeycomb core of the Apollo 6 adapter panels was-vented cell-
to-cell but not to the atmosphere. Consequently, a differential bursting
pressure would develop during launch. The ih.f-psi atmospheric pressure
of air trapped in the core at lift-off would be increased by aerodynamic
heating of the adapter surface. The temperatures on Apollo 6 were high
enough that any water in the panel would have been converted to steam.
To bracket the range of pressure the Apollo 6 honeycomb core could
have experienced, an analysis was performed both with and without water
in the cells.- The results (fig. 8) indicated that a maximum pressure
of approximately 33 psig could have been attained at the time of the
anomaly, when the outer and inner facesheets were at temperatures of
297° F and 202° F, respectively.
ABILITY OF PANELS TO CONTAIN PRESSURE
Pressure tests were performed on panels to determine the effects of
bond voids, crushed core, heat, water, and load on panel integrity. The
results-are .summarized in tables I through III, figure 9, and the fol-
lowing paragraphs. . • .
• Sheet-to-Core.Bond Voids .
Tests to establish how sheet-to-core bond voids affect pressure con-
tainment capability are summarized in figure 9. These tests were per-
formed on.15- -by 15-inch panels with 0.029- and 0.015-inch aluminum face-
sheets and 1/U- by 0.001-inch aluminum honeycomb core. The test specimens
were sealed by edge frame members so that high pressures could be applied
to the core without leakage. The test consisted simply of pressurizing
the specimen until failure, noting the failing pressure. No load or heat
was applied.
These specimens failed by the mechanism of the built-in void permit-
ting the facesheet to bulge to a curvature such that the peel strength of
the adhesive was exceeded. Once started, the entire facesheet came off
explosively. The data from these tests indicate that the relationship
between pressure containment capability and void size is fairly predict-
able.
Effects of Dents
Panel tests performed to determine effects of dents are summarized
in table I. The test specimens were identical in size to those used
in the sheet-to-core void tests , but they had no bond voids. Indentation
was achieved by a pendulum fixed-mass system with which dents of various
diameters and depths could be made.
These tests were originated because of the possibility that debond-
ing between facesheet and core might result if the inside surface of the
adapter was inadvertently struck and dented during launch preparation work
on the lunar module; this work is performed on platforms attached to the
adapter inner wall. However, debonding evidently does not occur. The
pressure containment capability of the panels with dents was much "better
than that of the panels with sheet-to-core bond voids. Depth of the dent
appeared to be more significant than diameter. Depths up to 0.030 inch
did not affect pressure containment capability. The crushed core result-
ing from dents 0.039- to 0.059-inch deep, degraded the pressure containment
capability by about 26 percent.
Effects of Moisture and Heat
The adapter panels are bonded with HT-U2H adhesive. From handbook
type data, obtained from a number of investigators , it is known that the
strength of this adhesive is degraded by heat and by moisture. Recent
tests on small specimens indicate U7 percent degradation of tensile
strength after a 30-day soak in water, followed by a 1/2-hour thermal
soak at 300° F.
In order to obtain insight regarding the effects of moisture and
heat on pressure tolerance of the adapter panels, tests were performed
by the contractor and by MSC, using specimens representative of the
adapter panel construction. The contractor used 15- by 15-inch specimens;
MSC used 2U- by 36-inch specimens. The results of these tests are given
in table II.
Basic differences in the manner in which these test programs were
conducted may account for some of the inconsistency of the results. In
the contractor's tests, the specimens were deliberately heated slowly,
requiring from 30 minutes to an hour to achieve test temperatures. This
was done to permit good temperature control and to permit the wet speci-
mens to pressurize by conversion of the moisture to steam. At MSC, a
flight-representative temperature/time profile was applied to the speci-
mens , which were then failed with an external pressure source, the total
test time being about 10 minutes.
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These kinds of test are difficult to perform with consistent results
because of difficulty in achieving a uniform distribution of the moisture
within the panel prior to the start of. the test. The optimum amount of
water which would have created the maximum pressure of 33 psi at the
time of the Apollo 6 adapter failure is between 0.1 and 0.05 percent by
volume. A lesser amount of water would not produce enough steam; too
much water would create a heat sink and hold temperatures down, with a
limited amount of heat applied. In both test series, moisture was intro-
duced into specimens by pulling a vacuum at one port on the panel and
introducing water in a port on the opposite side of the panel. X-rays
of the MSC test- specimens prior to the start of testing indicated random
and incomplete distribution of moisture. Inasmuch as the contractor's
specimens were heated slowly, the resulting "simmering" effect would tend
to produce better distribution. On the other hand, the prolonged' exposure
to heat and pressure introduces a degrading creep effect which is non-
representative of flight conditions.
Consequently, these tests did not yield quantitative data. However,
accepting the data as is, it has been concluded that the Apollo 6 flight
failure could not have resulted from this failure mode alone.'
Effects of Load, Heat, and Voids
• Tests for combined effects of load, heat, and voids are summarized
in table III. The test specimens had the same core size and facesheet
thickness as those used in the previous test programs, but they were
only 12 by 12 inches, had no edge framing, and had a doubler bonded to
each facesheet at the two loaded ends. The test plan was to achieve a
specified load and temperature, then pressurize the panel to failure.
However, without edge framing, which would have affected load-carrying
capability, the panels leaked so badly that pressures of only 35 to
U5 psi could be attained (the compound, used to seal the edges of the
panels would blow out).. Therefore, the tests were conducted by attain-,
ing the maximum pressure possible and then increasing the end loading
until the panel failed.
Panel 55 with a 1-inch-diameter void, was loaded to design ultimate
while a U5-psig core pressure and the Apollo 6 heating conditions were
being applied. Subsequent inspection revealed no propagation of the
void. All other specimens with 1-inch-diameter voids demonstrated
end-loading capability well above the design ultimate load; specimens
with 2-inch-diameter voids failed slightly below design ultimate loading.
Thus, from these tests, it is concluded that combined loading with
reasonable size voids, alone, could not have caused the flight failure.
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PERTINENT INSPECTION HISTORY OF ADAPTERS
The 'adapter is manufactured in circumferential quarter sections and
is inspected at the factory for bond quality. The automated ultrasonic
through-transmission technique used for this inspection employs water to
couple a probe to the test surface and uses transmitted energy in the
0.5- to 5.0-MHz band. The panel surface is scanned at 0.1-inch intervals,
and a permanent record (C-scan) of the response is generated. The scan
lines are of uniform density except when the probe traverses bond voids,
adhesive-filled core, and edges of facesheets,- splice plates, and doublers .
The location and extent of any voids can thus be determined from this C-
scan. However, in the area of core splices, doublers, etc. , a C-scan is
inconclusive in that existing voids may be mistaken for normal construc-
tion details. Therefore, X-rays are generally taken when a discrepant
condition is suspected. All voids are repaired by injecting adhesive;
after the adhesive has cured, the area is reinspected, usually by coin
tapping, to assure that an adequate bond has been made.
The C-scan from the -Z panel of the Apollo 6 adapter contained an
anomalous area (see fig. 10), approximately 2 feet long at the station 709
butt splice near the +Y edge of the panel. However, no X-rays were taken
in this area. Subsequently, inspection of C-scan and X-ray records for
adapters 12, 13, 1^, 15, and l6 revealed that deficient assembly techniques
of the adapter at station 709 have consistently resulted in abnormalities
in the structure at this station. With the .additional knowledge gained
by comparison of the C-scan and X-ray records on the same structure, the
C-scan record for the adapter of Apollo 6 was reviewed recently, and it
was concluded that voids were present in the -Y panel and that very like-
ly the anomalous area in the -Z panel contained intermittent voids.
Figure 11 illustrates the deficient assembly at the 709 splice of
adapters 12 through 16. The outside doubler, the outside facesheets, and
the internal doubler are assembled in the relative positions shown and
are placed on a "glide" sheet which has the curvature of the adapter
quarter panel. These four elements cannot move with respect to each other
because they are tack-riveted. On the assembly of facesheets and doublers
are placed three honeycomb core elements (A, Bl, and B2 in the figure).
Honeycomb core A is approximately the width of the internal doubler, is
placed over the doubler, and is shallower than cores Bl and B2 by an
amount equal to the thickness, 0.032 inch, of the internal doubler.
Cores Bl and B2 should rest on the facesheets.
The deficiency identified in the adapters is caused by core Bl being
misplaced onto the internal doubler, as shown in the lower left of fig-
ure 11. The misplacement of core Bl, or of core B2, then produces a bump
in the internal face sheet, displaces core A, and creates the three voids
shown. If adequate adhesive is provided for the core splicing operation,
void A and B will be filled by the foaming adhesive. However, void C may
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not fill because the core overlap on the internal doubler can prevent pas-
sage of the adhesive into this void. If the quantity of adhesive supplied
for the core splices is inadequate, voids A and B may also exist. Void C
was found on adapters 13, lU, and 15 and has been repaired by injection of
adhesive. .
Prior to the Apollo 6 anomaly, adapters were not. further inspected
for bond voids after leaving the factory, except by coin tapping .-at sus-
pected' areas of damage. One adapter (SLA 5) was returned to the-factory
after'having'been at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) for-some" time and was .;
given-a receiving inspection by portable equipment. Since the anomaly,••
three-'adapters (SLA 5, TA, and 11) -have been inspected by the portable
eddy sonic technique at KSC; only four debonds have been found: three,
doubler-to-facesheet debonds and one facesheet-to-core debond under a
damaged bracket. One doubler debond was about 3 inches in diameter, the
others' were less than 1 inch in diameter, and all were .either in or near...
a previously repaired area. The -facesheet-to-core debond was; 1/2.inch,
in diameter and was under the attachment rivet of a damaged electrical . ,
harness support bracket. The Apollo 6 adapter had 6^9 of these brackets,
most1 of-them on the -Z panel; each bracket was attached-to,the inner
'facesheet with four-rivets. - • - - . - .
'•' In' another type of inspection, the porta-pull test., an annular .cut
is made in the facesheet to form a small-diameter specimen "of facesheet.
bonded'to core. A lug is then bonded to the specimen and subsequently
pulled to ascertain whether the tensile strength of the-adhesive.is within
specification limits. Adapters have always passed these tests... In one
.adapter, TA, some water was.found in the panel when the annular cut was
made. This particular adapter had been exposed to weather for .-some time,
prior to the porta-pull test. The Apollo 6 adapter had-been drenched in
a rainstorm when its cover blew off during transport to the pad. A recent
review indicates that normal panels are thoroughly sealed.on all edges and
that it is unlikely that a rain shower would cause water to enter the
honeycomb core. • ' • - . . - • . • • •
SUMMATION OF FINDINGS AND EVALUATION
From the foregoing discussion, the anomaly seems to- have all o,f the
characteristics that are consistent with the inner.facesheet separating
from the panel. The event was sudden, the outside surface had the flimsy
characteristic expected of a thin facesheet, the panel lost effective-
ness for carrying longitudinal loading, 'and the parts that, came off were
not'complete sandwich panel but only outer facesheet, possibly with some
core attached. ' ' ' ' . '
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To verify that a large amount of inside sheet can come off without
taking the outside sheet with it, a test was performed.using a full cir-
cular section of an adapter (SLA 2). A' pressure of 77 psi applied to '
the core removed the entire inner facesheet from one panel and split the
outer facesheet longitudinally as a result of the excessive hoop tension.
The core had been deliberately crushed in a 3-inch-diameter area to pre-
cipitate failure. (A bond void would have lowered the failing pres.sure,
but this was impractical to accomplish on the existing test specimen.)
All the evidence, in combination, establishes that differential pressure
in the honeycomb core was the mechanism that produced the large extent of
panel failure of the Apollo 6 adapter. The'estimated failed area is shown
in figure 12.
Although the nature of the failure is believed to be understood, the
weakness or flaw through which the failure might have begun could have
been any one or a combination of several possibilities uncovered by the
investigation. The exact nature of the 2-foot anomalous area in the
ultrasonic C-scan cannot be explained since X-rays were not taken; how-
ever, a major anomaly was undoubtedly present. Many electrical harness
support brackets were riveted to the inner facesheet of the -Z panel;
any one of these brackets, if inadvertently struck or improperly loaded,
could have lifted the facesheet from the core and caused a debond. Tol-
erances for the retention cable attach bolt could have allowed a 3-inch-
diameter area of core to be crushed by bolt torque. All of these possible
flaws were located in the area of the failure oh the Apollo 6 adapter.
Finally, moisture may have, contributed by reducing the ability of the
panel to contain pressure.
In an effort to narrow these possibilities, additional tests were
performed. Electrical harness support brackets were pulled off the
inner facesheet to determine how much debonding could result. Although
all four rivets failed and the bracket was pulled completely off the
panel, the only debonding was on the order of 1/2 inch in diameter at
the rivet attach points. Test specimens representative of splice-plate-
to-facesheet bonds were prepared with built-in bond voids and tested to
establish whether the voids would propagate. The bond voids did not
propagate; the specimens failed at the expected stress level, consistent
with the reduced area of bond. These modes of failure for the anomaly
are improbable.
The retention cable attachment bolt is not a strong suspect because
the bolt installation had to be intact to permit the panel to withstand
the closing forces generated by the orbital tumbling. Photographic evi-
dence substantiates that the panel did resist these forces. This mode
of failure is improbable.
Hence, a.deficiency associated with the large anomalous area of the
C-scan is highly suspected as being the initiator 6f the failure.' The
station .709 abnormalities found consistently in later adapters substan-
tiate this .suspicion. ' " '
CONCLUSIONS
The most, probable cause of the Apollo 6 adapter failure was an ab-
normal splice assembly at station 709, resulting in a facesheet bond too
weak for the internal panel pressures achieved.
The anomaly demonstrated the basic integrity of the adapter, in that
even with some of the structure ineffective, the adapter sustained the
loading, at the, end of first-stage boost. This 'structural integrity'-has '
been substantiated through extensive analyses and test efforts. Two major
tests (a short-stack dynamic test and a short-stack static'test), many :
smaller, experimental tests, and many analyses were conducted "under the
direction.of the Structures and Mechanics Division at the Manned Space-
craft Center. These involved effort by the Langley Research Center, the
North American Rockwell Corporation, the Grumman' Aircraft Engineering • •
Corporation, Philco Ford, The Boeing Company, Bell Aerosystems, and TRW,
Incorporated. .The large tests, and many of the smaller ones, utilized •
flight-type hardware. Capability for the dynamic 'and treating environ-
ments was fully explored. All of this effort verified structural integ-
rity for subsequent missions and established that the Apollo 6 adapter-
failure was not caused by a basic design deficiency. •• "
CORRECTIVE ACTION
. Future adapters will have a cork covering over the external surface
to reduce, temperatures and internal pressures. Also, small holes will
be drilled in the inner facesheet to vent the panels. Flight pressures'1
will then be only 50 or less percent of the pressures experienced oh
Apollo 6. (fig. 13). The effectiveness of corking and'venting was assessed,
based upon the results of a panel vent test performed by the contractor
(fig. lU) and upon the lower temperatures attained with 0.030-inch cork
covering (fig. 15).. 'The results are given in figure 16. These pressures
are applicable for all Apollo missions having a launch thermal-response
corresponding to.the Apollo 9 baseline trajectory. • • • ' • '
Additionally, the portable eddy-sonic technique'will'be -use'd to in-
spect for bond quality after the adapter arrives at Kennedy Space Center.
.After all launch'preparation work on the lunar module has been completed
inside the adapter, the inside surface will be visually inspected for
15
inadvertent damage, zone by zone, with specific approval required for
each zoned area.
Special precaution will be taken to assure.that the panels are free
of moisture.
The above actions were taken prior to the recently flown missions.
Since the splice abnormalities have been identified, the affected regions
have been repaired by adhesive injection. The Structures and Mechanics
Division has determined that the core-splice splice plate (fig. 11) is
not required. Consequently, the contractor has been directed to revise
the design to not have this internal splice plate and thus avoid abnor-
mal assemblies in the panels yet to'be bonded.
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TABLE I.- EFFECTS OF DENTS
Dent size , in.
Diameter
0
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
5
5
5
Depth
O
0.039
0.039
0.039
0.050
0.050
0.059
0.02H
0.030
0.038
0.010
0.010
0.026
.Pressure at, failure,
. ;• :, ...psig. .-. ,
265 . . '
199
195
193
199
179
18?
335
268
235
3VT
231*
230
17
TABLE II.- EFFECTS OF MOISTURE AND TEMPERATURE
(a) Tests Performed By Contractor
Panel
number
1, 2, 3
H
5
6
7 .
8
9, 10,
11, 12,
13*
Temperature ,
°F
272 to 36l
335
Ambient
Ambi ent
325
Ambient
325
Ambient
295
Elevated
Moisture content
( by volume ) ,
percent
. 1
0
0
0
0
0
0
o ;
1
1
Pressure , psig
No failure
253
253
252
19^
Failure
kO to 50
5U
152
162
118
37
1+3 to 52
*Two of these had 1-inch-diameter bond voids but failed on the
facesheet opposite the one with the void.
(b) Tests Performed By MSC
Panel
number
1
2
3
1*
5
6
Temperature , °F
Outer
facesheet
239
2hO
2kk
2kl
21+3
2*+5
Inner
facesheet
221+
221
236
233
229
232
Burst
pressure,
psig
112
112
101+
78
125
115
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TABLE III.- EFFECTS OF,LOAD,-ELEVATED -TEMPERATURE, AND -VOIDS
Panel
no.
i .:
2
3
1*
:5
6
7
:s
d9
Temperature , °F
Inner
facesheet.
- • -
150
. 150
150
-" 11*5
IHO
Outer
facesheet
275
320
295
295
295
295
295
295
295 .
Load, Ib/in
No
failure
1500."
1500
12UO
Failure
1775
11*65
1900
1210
1120
1150 -
Pressure ,
psig '
....
 aUO
a30'' '
a30. .
- 0
>5
35
1*0
1*0
2.5 •
Void
diameter,
in.
. . . Q . ..
0
0
• V
clbl
2
2 "
.•'. -2- -
Higher pressure could not be attained because panel leaked-badly.
Failure not in void area. Doubler added for load input rolled over
and cut into facesheet. .... ' .
c.
void.
'Void did not propagate. Ultimate design load is 12HO Ib/in.
One .percent moisture.. (by .volume) ..injected .into panel. .,. Failed through
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180 deg
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Terminator — N^ , \
•^ k. 1 1
r"Edge of panel
(not visible)
709 (splice)
Frame and
access door
—583 (hinge)
I
(a) 2:13.287.
Figure 1.- Densitometer traces at time of anomaly.
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Figure 1.- Continued.
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Frame and
access door
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\
(c) 2:14.054.
Figure 1.- Concluded.
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Figure 2.- Pieces observed at 2:13.587,
s.
o
OJ
-*_»
"3
CO1
0
^—^
T
I
o
CM
'CO
r-H
c\i
in
CM
CM
ro
C
O
03
"c
<u
E
i/i
c
O)
o
Q.
Oo
™ CM .0 O)
o
Q
o ro
CM
CO
CM E a O
"a -a '±J
E o o
o -ti o
Oo. ro
CM
"V o5 §Q. .—
o: rt ro
S + "S
rz -a a
cu
1
01
CO
0)
_o
<
oJ->
o
-E
Q.
CNJ
PI
r-H
CM
c
ro
ro
'c
u.
re
o
01
re
01
c
re
—i
c
<D
5
01
reB.
a;
c01
01
Is
-o
<
I
01
26
ro
— CD
£ E
_> T^j_l H3
cn
O
C/)
QJ
(/)
l/l
OJja
CO
I
en
jsd
o
<L>
in
O)p
s
3
O
x-
b
-a
a>
-a
o
O
-O
<u
^
3
gi
LJ_
|sd
28
o
_a
cu
S
1
±J
re
_OJ
-Q
ro
o
o
Qi
I
•
r»-
QJ
3
01
29
44
40
36
32
28
•= 24
£
to
a 20
Q.
16
12
4 h
0 _L
- Adapter cavity pressure
and ambient pressure
_L _L
•No water in cells
Time of Apollo 6
anomaly
S-IC cutoff
_L J_ J
0:00 0:20 0:40 1:00 1:20 1:40 2:00 2:20 2:40 3:00
Time, min:sec
Figure 8.- Innercell pressure on Apollo 6 during launch.
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